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Abstract
Election systems must ensure that representatives are chosen by voters.
Moreover, each voter should have equal influence. Traditionally, this has
been achieved by permitting voters to cast at most one ballot. More re-
cently, this has been achieved by tallying the last ballot cast by each voter.
We show this is not achieved by the Helios election system, because an ad-
versary can cause a ballot other than a voter’s last to be tallied. Moreover,
we show how the adversary can choose the contents of such a ballot, thus the
adversary can unduly influence the selection of representatives.
1. Introduction
An election is a decision-making procedure to choose representatives [1,
2, 3, 4]. Choices are made by voters, and this must be ensured by election
systems, as prescribed by the United Nations [5, Article 21], the Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe [6, Paragraph 7.3], and the
Organization of American States [7, Article 23]. These organisations also
prescribe that systems must ensure that voters have equal influence in the
decision [5, 6, 7]. This has led to the emergence of the following eligibility
and non-reusability requirements [8, 9].1
• Eligibility. Choices are only made by voters.
1Kremer & Ryan capture both requirements in a single, informal definition, namely,
“only...voters can vote, and only once” [8], whereas Backes et al. decouple that definition
into “only...voters can vote” and “every voter can vote only once” [9]. (We refer to voters
and non-voters, whereas Kremer & Ryan and Backes et al. distinguish non-voters from
‘legitimate voters’ and ‘eligible voters.’)
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Eligibility ensures that non-voters cannot (directly) influence the decision.
For instance, national elections typically require that voters are citizens of
the nation, thus, eligibility forbids influence from foreign citizens.2
• Non-reusability. Only one choice of each voter has influence.
Non-reusability ensures that each voter can contribute at most one choice,
hence, voters have equal influence. In addition, for verifiable elections [12,
13, 14, 15, 16], non-reusability is useful to aid recovery from failure (since
voters can “vote, verify, and revote until verification succeeds” [17, §1]).
Election systems have traditionally permitted each voter to cast at most
one choice. More recent systems permit multiple choices (e.g., [18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23]) and a voter’s last choice should have influence. We strengthen
the aforementioned non-reusability requirement to capture such influence.
• Strong non-reusability. Only the last choice of each voter has influence.
Strong non-reusability enables voters to change their choices, which provides
flexibility, and aids education (since voters can “ask the help of anyone for
submitting a random ballot, and then re-voting privately afterwards” [20,
§3.3]). By comparison, (weak) non-reusability does not enable voters to
change their choices, because that notion does not specify which ballot should
have influence. Hence, it is permissible for a choice, other than the voter’s
last, to have influence. Consequently, voters cannot change their choices,
because voters do not know which of their choices will have influence. Thus,
the notions of non-reusability by Kremer & Ryan [8] and Backes et al. [9]
are too weak to analyse an interesting property of recent election systems; a
slight strengthening of their notions is necessary.
Eligibility and non-reusability are fundamental requirements of election
systems [5, 6, 7], as-is strong non-reusability when voters are permitted to
change their choices. These requirements all assume that the adversary’s
capabilities are limited to controlling the communication channel and that
the election system is operated in the prescribed manner, hence, they are
not intended to exclude attacks that arise when the election system is sub-
verted by the adversary (to authenticate non-voter ballots, for instance). By
2We concede that non-voters may indirectly influence the decision, e.g., voters may be
swayed by disinformation [10, 11].
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comparison, verifiability requirements assume the election system has been
subverted and are intended to enable the detection, rather than exclusion,
of attacks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. It follows that an election system that satis-
fies eligibility, non-reusability, and strong non-reusability is invulnerable to
attacks against those requirements when the election system is operated in
the prescribed manner, whereas a verifiable system might be vulnerable to
attacks, but those attacks can be detected. Thus, eligibility, non-reusability,
and strong non-reusability should be satisfied regardless of whether verifia-
bility is, because election systems operated in the prescribed manner should
prevent attacks by network adversaries, rather than just enabling attack de-
tection.
We analyse Helios [20]: an open-source, web-based election system,3
which has been used by the International Association of Cryptologic Re-
search (IACR), the ACM, the Catholic University of Louvain, and Princeton
University [24]. Helios uses a third party to authenticate voters’ ballots,
which suffices for eligibility, assuming the third party is trusted. Authenti-
cated ballots are listed alongside voter identities and at most one ballot is
listed alongside each identity, which suffices for non-reusability. Any other
ballots are archived. Auditing can be used to statistically determine whether
non-voter ballots are incorrectly authenticated by an untrusted third party
or whether unauthenticated ballots are listed. For instance, voters can be
asked whether the ballot alongside their identity is theirs, to determine if the
ballot was incorrectly authenticated or simply unauthenticated. Albeit coop-
eration and honesty of some voters is required for auditing, and sufficiently
many malicious voters can manipulate audits.
Contribution. We show that the archiving mechanism used by Helios is in-
sufficient to ensure strong non-reusability, in the presence of an adversary
that is able to delay messages sent on the network. In particular, the adver-
sary can cause a choice other than a voter’s last to be counted. Moreover, we
show how the adversary can pick the choice, in a poll station with a malicious
election supervisor. Although malice can be detected by voters that perform
verifiability checks once voting closes, recovery is only possible before tallying
commences.
3https://vote.heliosvoting.org, accessed 11 Aug 2017.
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2. Analysis of Helios
2.1. Protocol description
An execution of Helios (Figure 1) proceeds as follows. First, a voter casts
a ballot for their choice: the voter encrypts their choice (1) and sends their
encrypted choice to the bulletin board (2). Secondly, the voter authenticates
their encrypted choice to the bulletin board, to prove they are indeed a voter.
The authentication process uses OAuth [25],4 which is reliant on a third party.
The process proceeds as follows. The voter authenticates to a third party (3),
the third party generates a token for the voter (4), the voter sends the token
to the bulletin board (5), and the bulletin board relays the token to the third
party (6). The third party checks whether the token is valid and notifies
the bulletin board of the token’s validity (7). If the token is valid, then
the bulletin board accepts the voter’s encrypted choice. Hence, the bulletin
board contains the voter’s authenticated encrypted choice. In addition, the
bulletin board archives any encrypted choice previously accepted for that
voter,5 which is intended to ensure that only the last choice of each voter
has influence. Finally, the bulletin board homomorphically combines the
accepted encrypted choices (8), the administrator decrypts the homomorphic
combination (9), and the bulletin board reveals those decrypted choices (10).
Helios satisfies eligibility, because encrypted choices are only accepted by the
bulletin board when accompanied by a token authenticating the voter that
constructed the encrypted choice. Moreover, Helios satisfies non-reusability
too, because, upon acceptance, the bulletin board archives any encrypted
choice previously accepted for that voter. But, this is insufficient for strong
non-reusability.
2.2. Vulnerability
The flow of our exploit initially corresponds to an honest execution: a
voter casts a ballot for their choice, as per Figure 1a. The remaining steps
(Figure 2) proceed as follows. First, the adversary intercepts a voter’s token:
the voter authenticates to a third party (1), receives an authentication token
(2), and sends the token to the bulletin board (3), but it is intercepted by
4Other authentication methods are also supported.
5See Voter.last cast vote() in https://github.com/benadida/helios-server/
blob/9fa74a2bef41c0c344f1c9a6f1c28a36f93347ea/helios/models.py, accessed 11
Aug 2017.
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Figure 1: Helios protocol flow
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the adversary (4).6 (We indicate the ballot-token relation by colouring the
top right-hand corner of the ballot and the token in purple.) Thus, the
bulletin board contains an unauthenticated encrypted choice and is awaiting
an authentication token for that encrypted choice. Next, the adversary waits
until the voter casts another encrypted choice (5), authenticates with the
third party (6), receives a token (7), and sends the token to the bulletin
board (8). (We indicate the ballot-token relation using green colouring.)
Thus, the bulletin board can authenticate the voter’s second ballot. Finally,
the adversary releases the intercepted token and it is received by the bulletin
board (9). Thus, the bulletin board will accept the voter’s first ballot, and
archive the voter’s second ballot (10). Consequently, the voter’s first choice
is counted, rather than their second. Hence, strong non-reusability is not
satisfied, because only the last choice of the voter should have influence,
which is not the case.
Video demonstration. The exploit is demonstrated in a supporting video [26].
Helios developers Ben Adida and Olivier Pereira acknowledge the exis-
tence of this vulnerability, but they contend it would be detected.7 We will
discuss detection mechanisms in the following section.
2.3. Impact
Let us now consider the possibility of an adversary unduly influencing an
election’s outcome, in settings where Helios is deployed in voting terminals lo-
cated at poll stations. In such settings, a malicious election supervisor could
offer to demonstrate the Helios system to a voter, under the guise of educa-
tion. During the demonstration, the supervisor could suggest that the voter
selects a particular choice. This should not cause suspicion, because Helios is
intended to permit voters to change their choices (§1). Once the voter casts
the demonstration ballot, it could be intercepted, perhaps by a router in the
6An adversary can intercept packets even when they are encrypted. For example, pack-
ets sent over a TLS connection, i.e., encrypted packets, can be intercepted. Intercepting a
TLS packet prevents further data from being received on that TLS connection (until the
packet is released), but data may be received on other TLS connections (of which there are
many), because TLS does not guarantee ordering of messages between connections. (Mul-
tiple TLS connections are maintained to reduce latency.) Hence, TLS does not prevent
further communication between the voter and the bulletin board.
7Email communication, April 2014.
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Figure 2: Helios exploit flow
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polling station that the supervisor controls. After the demonstration, the su-
pervisor could instruct the voter to re-vote in private. Once the voter leaves
the poll station, the intercepted ballot could be released. Consequently, the
supervisor’s choice is tallied, rather than the voter’s, thereby demonstrating
the possibility of undue influence.
We acknowledge that the voter can discover that malice has taken place,
because Helios satisfies individual verifiability [15, 13] and the voter can
check whether the bulletin board accepted their second encrypted choice.
However, it is well-known that many voters do not perform checks necessary
for verifiability and voting systems rely on checks being performed by suf-
ficiently many diligent voters [27, §2.1.6]. Thus, the exploit is particularly
effective against voters that do not perform checks. Moreover, even if malice
is detected, recovery is only possible when a voter successfully casts another
encrypted choice (before tallying), hence, the exploit can also be effective
against voters that detect malice. Effectiveness can be improved by releas-
ing the intercepted ballot just before voting closes, this not only reduces the
voter’s opportunity to detect malice, but also forces the voter to convince
officials that they should be able to cast another ballot after voting closes,
which is problematic, because there is no convincing evidence that any mal-
practice has taken place. Once tallying commences, the voter cannot recover,
furthermore, given the absence of any evidence, victims have little recourse.
We believe that verification checks should serve as a last line of defence
and that election systems should prevent many attacks, rather than merely
being able to detect them (especially as detection does not imply the ability
to recover). Hence, we believe eligibility and non-reusability are worthy of
study independently of verifiability.
2.4. Fixes
We can patch the vulnerability by checking authentication token times-
tamps, timestamping ballots, coupling encrypted choices with counters, or
proving knowledge of earlier encrypted choices a` la Clarkson, Chong & My-
ers [28, §3.3]. We favour solutions using timestamps, since the other ap-
proaches require the voter to maintain state. Moreover, timestamps have
been acknowledged as a possibility for a fix by Helios developer Olivier
Pereira.8 We concede that timestamps increase the attack surface, since
8Email communication, April 2014.
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an adversary may tamper with clocks. But, we stress that the third party is
already assumed to construct authentication tokens correctly and that voters
are already assumed to construct ballots correctly (or, at least, audit ballots
to increase confidence of correct construction),9 hence, tampering with clocks
might be precluded by those assumptions.
OAuth tokens may contain timestamps [29, §2.2] and these can be used
to determine the order in which ballots were authenticated. Similarly, ballots
could be extended to include timestamps which can be used to determine the
order in which ballots were constructed.10 These timestamps can be used by
the bulletin board to patch the vulnerability. Indeed, rather than archiving
any encrypted choice previously accepted for a voter, the bulletin board can
archive any encrypted choice associated with an earlier timestamp.
The validity of tokens can only be checked by the bulletin board, because
tokens must remain secret. Thus, the bulletin board might convince itself
that ballots are authenticated, but it cannot convince other parties. Devel-
oping an authentication mechanism that permits anyone to check the validity
of authentication tokens, rather than just the bulletin board, would be an
interesting direction for future work. Alternatively, voters can be issued with
credentials and cryptography can be used to ensure that only voters can con-
struct authorised ballots (i.e., authorised ballots are unforgeable [30, §1]).
For instance, Quaglia & Smyth [31] replace tokens with digital signatures.
But, solutions reliant on cryptography seem to require expensive infrastruc-
tures for voter credentials and seemingly ignore the problem of corruption
during the registration procedure [15, §4]. Indeed, auditing is required to
check whether any non-voters are issued credentials. Eliminating such au-
dits is desirable, but perhaps impossible.
9Auditing ballots provides assurance that ballots (constructed by untrusted systems)
are cast as intended, in particular, ballots encapsulate voters’ choices. This property is
complimentary to individual verifiability, which allows voters to check whether their ballot
is accepted by the bulletin board.
10An encrypted choice comprises of El Gamal ciphertexts and non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs, and timestamps could be included in hashes used by proofs. This
ensures that timestamps cannot be modified, if they are to be accepted by the bulletin
board, because the board checks validity of proofs before accepting them.
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3. Related work
Smyth & Pironti [32] identify a flaw in Helios’s sign-out procedure which
can be exploited by TLS truncation attacks to dupe voters into believing
they have successfully signed-out, when they have not. Thus, an adversary
can make a choice on the voter’s behalf from the terminal used by the voter,
thereby violating eligibility. Beyond eligibility and non-reusability, malleabil-
ity has been exploited to launch violate ballot secrecy [33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and
verifiability [15], and unsound proofs of knowledge have been exploited to
violate verifiability [38].
4. Conclusion
We have shown that Helios does not satisfy strong non-reusability, be-
cause an adversary can cause a ballot other than a voter’s last to be tallied.
In particular, the adversary can intercept the authorisation token associated
with the ballot that the adversary wants tallied, wait until the voter has
casts their last ballot, and then release the intercepted token. The released
token causes the bulletin board to accept the ballot that the adversary wants
tallied, and to archive the voter’s last ballot. Thus, strong non-reusability is
not satisfied. We have also shown that an adversary can choose the contents
of such ballots. In particular, the adversary can exploit the educational needs
of voters to cast a ballot for the adversary’s choice, and cause that ballot to
be tallied rather than the voter’s last, as we have explained. Consequently,
adversaries can unduly influence the selection of representatives. Although
victims may detect malice, there is no evidence that malpractice has taken
place, hence, victims have little recourse. The vulnerability is due to the
manner in which Helios interacts with OAuth. Hence, our exploit should
generalise to other systems that use OAuth in a similar manner and to sys-
tems that use similar authentication mechanisms. We hope that this article
leads to improvements in the Helios election system, advances understand-
ing of authentication mechanisms, and helps system developers to integrate
authentication mechanisms securely.
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